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PERMANENCY AT WHAT COST?
FIVE YEARS OF IMPRUDENCE UNDER THE
ADOPTION AND SAFE FAMILIES ACT OF 1997
PAUL ANTHONY WILHELM*
INTRODUCTION
The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nur-
ture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the
high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations. 1
Societies take very seriously the unity of the family as an
institution. Societies recently have taken broader steps toward
addressing the needs of their children. In the United States, pol-
icy has recently shifted attention away from the rights of families
to stay together, with incentives and mandates toward reunifica-
tion. Now family law policy focuses on terminating parental
rights more quickly, in order to move children out of the foster
system and into permanent new homes without needless delay.
The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 19972 [hereinafter ASFA]
signaled a shift in focus in the federal mandates concerning child
foster care and permanency determinations. The previous fed-
eral policy on this matter was embodied in the Adoption Assis-
tance and Child Welfare Act of 1980' [hereinafter AACWA].
This statute required that in order to receive federal funding,
state agencies were to use "reasonable efforts" to reunite families
before a permanency determination was made.4 It was an
approach that favored reunification of original families over
* B.A., 1997, University of Michigan; M.A., 1999, Vanderbilt University;
J.D. candidate, 2002, Notre Dame Law School. Thomas J. White Scholar, 2000-
2002. I would like to thank ProfessorJ. Eric Smithburn for his guidance in the
formational stages of this Note.
1. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 79 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring)
(quoting Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925)).
2. Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) (codified in 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 671-679 (West Supp. 1998)).
3. Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (1980) (codified in various sections of
42 U.S.C.).
4. See Christine H. Kim, Note, Putting Reason Back into the Reasonable Efforts
Requirement in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases, 1999 U. ILL. L. REv. 287, 288 (1999).
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mere expedition of the adoption process.5 The ASFA supplants
the AACWA in the federal code.
In a response to the growing conviction that the law was leav-
ing children in foster care too long and that children were unrea-
sonably being pushed back into families that were abusive,
Congress passed the ASFA in November 1997 with overwhelming
bi-partisan support, from both conservative and liberal groups.6
Advocates stressed four chief reforms that the Act would bring:
(1) removal of the "reasonable efforts" requirement, (2) a new
emphasis on the health and safety of the child, (3) an increase in
the speed at which children move out of foster care and back to
their families or to adoption, and (4) an increase in the number
of adoptions from the pool of children in foster care.7
This radical shift in our foster care and adoption policy sig-
nifies our nation's focus on efficiency at the expense of a proper
respect for the original family. This Note argues that the ASFA
of 1997 went too far in reversing the trends of the AACWA and in
doing so wrongly discriminated against parents who, due to pov-
erty, have lost their children to the foster care system. This is
true because cases of violence and abuse are, under the ASFA,
treated absolutely the same as cases of neglect as far as the new
time guidelines are concerned. The new expedited process may
be efficient, but it fails to account for the time that it takes to re-
establish housing, income, and a stable home in this society.
Therefore, more low-income children now face being perma-
nently severed from their families than ever before. In addition
to the imprudence of some of ASFA's sanctions against parents,
some of the sanctions may be subject to constitutional challenge
5. See Madelyn Freundlich, Expediting Termination of Parental Rights Solving
a Problem or Sowing the Seeds of a New Predicament?, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 97, 98
(1999) (Freundlich notes that the goals of the AACWA were three-fold: "to pre-
vent the unnecessary placement of children in foster care; reunify families
whenever possible; and reduce the time that children spend in foster care by
encouraging adoption when reunification was not possible.") (citing Martin
Guggenheim, The Effects of Recent Trends to Accelerate the Termination of Parental
Rights of Children in Foster Care: An Empirical Analysis in Two States, 29 FAM. L.Q.
121, 122 (1995)).
6. See Robert M. Gordon, Drifting Through Byzantium: The Promise and Fail-
ure of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 83 MINN. L. REv. 637, 637 (1999)
(noting that "[b]oth the conservative Heritage Foundation and the liberal Chil-
dren's Defense Fund endorsed ASFA. The House approved the bill in its final
form by a vote of 406 to 7. The Senate did not even call the roll."). See, e.g.,
CHILDREN's DEFENSE FUND, THE STATE OF AMERICA'S CHILDREN 66 (1998) (cited
in Dorothy E. Roberts, Access to Justice: Poverty, Race and New Directions in Child
Welfare Policy, 1 WASH. U.J. L. & POL'Y 63, 63 (1999) (noting the "alarming" fact
that "half a million children are in foster care in America")).
7. See Gordon, supra note 6, at 638-39; see also Kim, supra note 4, at 288.
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on the basis of procedural due process in light of M.L.B. v. S.L.J 8
and other Supreme Court case law. An Illinois case, In re H.G.,9
may have a ripple effect on other states, invalidating some provi-
sions on substantive due process grounds.
Both legal and religious principles oppose this public policy
effected by AFSA insofar as it contributes to the break-up of poor
families. First, as a matter of legal policy, the ASFA is deeply
flawed because it fails to distinguish between abuse, on the one
hand, and neglect on the other in its determination of time lim-
its within foster care. Second, the ASFA's increased severance of
poor families is deeply flawed as a matter of social ethics and
public policy because of the generally recognized policy in favor
of keeping families together. More powerfully, however, is the
critique of the ASFA from the perspective of Christian social
thought. The Christian principles of both subsidiarity and cove-
nant theology, when applied to the institution of the family,
stand in opposition to the methods and the results of the ASFA.
This Note will examine the ASFA in terms of its effect on
families in America, particularly those of lower socio-economic
standing, and then will examine the legal and ethical (especially
Christian-based) critiques of the ASFA and its effects. Part I will
focus on the difference in theory and law between neglect and
abuse. Part II will discuss the policy under ASFA's predecessor,
the AACWA. Part III will focus on the goals and content of the
ASFA, including an analysis of the history behind similar govern-
ment policy in America since the Progressive Era. Part IV will
discuss case law that demonstrates the new challenges within fam-
ily law under the ASFA, including racial and class disparities.
This section also will comment on the possibility of a procedural
due process challenge to ASFA. Part V will discuss the ethics of
permanency determinations from both Catholic and Reformed
theological perspectives. Finally, Part VI will discuss solutions to
the ASFA structure. Ultimately, this Note concludes that the
ASFA's goals are misplaced, the Act has created a colossal mess in
the courts, and it is needlessly breaking up poor families prema-
turely. Further, this Note argues that Congress should imple-
ment an amendment to the ASFA for those families who are at or
below the poverty level. This amendment should extend the fif-
teen-month provision for poor families, giving them a longer
time to correct financial conditions which contributed to "neg-
8. 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
9. 757 N.E.2d 864 (Ill. 2001) (holding that the fifteen-month provision of
the Illinois Adoption Act, 750 IL.. COMP. STAT. 50/1(D)(rn-1)(2001), was
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Illinois Constitu-
tion, as it violated substantive due process).
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lect," and it should change "reasonable efforts" to "diligent
efforts" or the substantial equivalent of such standard.
I. NEGLECT VERSUS ABUSE
The ASFA imposes federal mandates only insofar as states
wish to have federal money supplement their foster care pro-
grams. The Act provides federal money only where states
develop a plan that complies with a minimum set of require-
ments outlined in the Act.'0 The Act's funding is thus contin-
gent on the State developing standards with regard to time in
foster care, efforts toward reunification, and parental behavior
leading to more expeditious termination of rights. States ulti-
mately still use their own definitions of abuse or neglect, but the
Act combines throughout its concept of abuse and neglect, for
example, in determining when foster care begins, which is when
the State has found abuse or neglect." Termination procedures
can start as early as fifteen months after such a finding by a state
court.
The state has an interest in protecting the health and safety
of its children. But this state interest is traditionally balanced
against the fundamental right of parents to rear their children.'
2
10. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 671(a), 674 (West Supp. 1998).
11. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 675 (5) (F) (West Supp. 1998).
12. This right was found as a fundamental liberty interest subject to sub-
stantive due process first in Meer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (holding
a fundamental liberty interest in, inter alia, the right to "establish a home and
bring up children"). This right has been recently affirmed in Troxel v. Granville,
530 U.S. 57 (2000) and in In re KC., 745 N.E.2d 1223, 1241 (Ill. 2001), where
the Illinois Supreme Court summarized Troxel:
[T] he Court reiterated that a parent's fight to control the upbringing
of his or her children is a fundamental constitutional right. See Troxel
(plurality opinion) ("the interest of parents in the care, custody, and
control of their children-is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental lib-
erty interests recognized by this Court"); (Souter, J., concurring) ("a
parent's interests in the nurture, upbringing, companionship, care,
and custody of children are generally protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"); (Thomas, J., concurring)
(recognizing that the Court's prior case law establishes that "parents
have a fundamental constitutional right to rear their children"); (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) ("our cases leave no doubt that parents have a
FUNDAMENTAL liberty interest in caring for and guiding their chil-
dren"); (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("there is a beginning point that
commands general, perhaps unanimous, agreement in our separate
opinions: As our case law has developed, the custodial parent has a
constitutional fight to determine, without undue interference by the
state, how best to raise, nurture, and educate the child[, which] stems
from the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment"). Accordingly, we must employ strict scrutiny,
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Family law has developed a distinction between abuse and neg-
lect. Even the general definitions in Black's Law Dictionary are
helpful in showing the legal distinction between the two con-
cepts. Child abuse is defined as: "An intentional or neglectful
physical or emotional injury imposed on a child, including sex-
ual molestation."'" Child neglect is defined as: "The failure of a
person responsible for a minor to care for the minor's emotional
or physical needs."' 4 Black's seems to draw distinctions as to the
effect as well as the intent. Abuse denotes an "intentional or neg-
lectful injury," while neglect denotes "failure to care." The for-
mer subsumes intentional injury, while the latter includes only
mere breach of one's duty of care. The former seems to require
actual damages, while the latter includes no mention of actual
damages.
Family law statutory definitions show a mixed analysis. Child
abuse and neglect are defined at both the federal and state
levels.15 Although either abuse or neglect may result in termina-
tion of parental rights, some states have traditionally treated
them differently, at least in theory, respecting the above distinc-
tions." This policy of differentiation makes sense insofar as
and determine whether section 1 (D) (p) is necessary to a compelling
state interest and narrowly tailored thereto.
(internal citations omitted). See also Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
534-35 (1925); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972);
Quilloin v. Wallcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); Parham v.J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602
(1979); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); Washington v. Gluck-
sberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997).
13. BL.ACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 10 (7th ed. 1999).
14. Id. at 233.
15. See NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT INFO.,
"What is Child Maltreatment" (July, 2000), at http://www.calib.com/nccanch/
pubs/factsheets/childmal.cfm (last visited Apr. 22, 2001).
16. See, e.g., MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 722.622(2) (e), (f) (2000).
(e) "Child abuse" means harm or threatened harm to a child's health
or welfare by a parent, a legal guardian, or any other person responsi-
ble for the child's health or welfare, or by a teacher or teacher's aide,
that occurs through nonaccidental physical or mental injury; sexual
abuse; sexual exploitation; or maltreatment. (f) "Child neglect" means
harm or threatened harm to a child's health or welfare by a parent,
legal guardian, or any other person responsible for the child's health
or welfare that occurs through either of the following: (i) Negligent
treatment, including the failure to provide adequate food, clothing,
shelter, or medical care. (ii) Placing a child at an unreasonable risk to
the child's health or welfare by failure of the parent, legal guardian, or
other person responsible for the child's health or welfare to intervene
to eliminate that risk when that person is able to do so and has, or
should have, knowledge of the risk.
2002]
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states decide to be in the business of treating degrees of intent
differently.17 Other states decide to have a more outcome or
result-based approach to parental unfitness, imposing a sort of
strict liability."8 The federal statute governing child abuse and
neglect combines the two concepts: "The term 'child abuse and
neglect' means, at a minimum, any recent act or failure to act on
the part of a parent or caretaker, which results in death, serious
physical or emotional harm . . . or ... which presents an immi-
nent risk of serious harm."' 9 In light of the fundamental rights
of parents,2 ° however, as will be discussed below, states should be
slow to ignore intent-based distinctions in their termination pro-
ceedings and determinations of unfitness.
The ASFA has a mixed approach to this question. On one
hand, the Act has removed any requirement of reasonable efforts
toward reunification where "aggravated circumstances" exist or
where the parent has committed murder, voluntary manslaugh-
ter, conspiracy to commit murder or attempted murder, or fel-
ony assault.2 ' On the other hand, the ASFA fails to distinguish
neglect versus abuse in the time limitations in foster care (and in
the definition of when foster care has begun) .22 If the child has
spent fifteen of the previous twenty-two months in foster care,
the state "shall file a petition to terminate the parental rights of
the child's parents."23 The petition is mandatory here except
where the state creates exceptions by placing the child with a rel-
ative, or the case plan suggests another route, or the state has not
(emphasis added); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-44 (2000) (applying the distinction
between an "abandoned" versus a "deprived" child); but see Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 600.020(1) (2000) (treating "abused or neglected child" as a single category).
17. See MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 722.622(2)(e), (f) (2000).
18. See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 600.020(1) (2000).
19. See The Federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act
(CAPTA), as amended and reauthorized in October 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-235
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5106(g) (2) (2001)). See also NATIONAL
CLEARINGHOUSE ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT INFO, "What is Child Maltreat-
ment" (July, 2000), at http://www.calib.com/nccanch/pubs/factsheets/child
mal.cfm (last visited Apr. 22, 2001).
20. See Mary O'Flynn, Comment, The Adoption and Safe Families Act of
1997: Changing Child Welfare Policy Without Addressing Parental Substance Abuse, 16
J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 243, 250 (1999) (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745, 756 (1982) as authority that parents have a "fundamental liberty inter-
est in the family and the care of the children").
21. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 671(a) (15) (D) (i), (ii)(I-IV) (West Supp. 1998); see
also 42 U.S.C.A. § 671 (a) (15) (D) (iii) (West Supp. 1998) (concluding sadly that
prior termination of rights to a sibling removes any "reasonable efforts" require-
ment); see Celeste Pagano, Recent Legislation: Adoption and Foster Care, 36 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 242, 245 (1999).
22. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 675(5)(F) (West Supp. 1998).
23. 42 U.S.C.A. § 675(5)(E) (West Supp. 1998).
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yet provided services that the case plan has outlined, in cases
where reasonable efforts are required.24
This mandatory petition is a major flaw in the ASFA with
regard to poor parents, who, without regard to intent, have failed
to provide their children with services or such things as the state
deems essential. Indeed, the federal government has set the
deadline, leaving it up to the states' goodwill, in the form of state
welfare programs and other social services, to meet that dead-
line. This heavy-handed and one-sided approach to termination
was brought about in the name of bringing more children out of
"bad homes" and out of "legal limbo."25 However, expediting
the process has led to premature terminations. One commenta-
tor notes, "By specifying the point at which efforts should end
instead of requiring specific services, the new time limits may in
some circumstances split up families who would have had a
chance."26 As this Note argues, poor families are especially being
left behind by ASFA.
II. PERMANENCY POLICY UNDER THE AACWA
Under the prior statute, AACWA, which established uniform
state guidelines for foster care and permanency plans (in order
to receive federal money), state agencies who received federal
foster care funding were required to make "reasonable efforts" in
all cases without regard to time limits. The policy of the AACWA
had the clear policy goal of reunification, with termination as a
sure possibility for those cases in which the "reasonable efforts"
failed.2" The policy was clearly tilted in favor of parental rights
generally, over and above the state interest in "health and safety"
of the child, as determined by statutes and "experts." The policy
was one that erred on the side of keeping families, although
unstable, together rather than erring on the side of breaking up
questionable families so children could be adopted.
When passed, the AACWA was a major change for its time.
It was the first attempt at providing federal funds to reduce the
time children would spend in foster care. The government pro-
vided financial incentives in the form of government grants to
states to conduct permanency hearings for foster children after
eighteen months in foster care.
24. Id.
25. See Pagano, supra note 21, at 246 (citing Hearings on H.R. 867 Before the
Human Resources Subcomm. of the House Ways and Means Comm., 98th Cong.
(1997) (statement of Senator Mike Dewine (R-Ohio)).
26. Id. at 246.
27. See Kim, supra note 4, at 289-98; see O'Flynn, supra note 20, at 250-55.
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The "psychological parent" theory in part influenced this
policy. The theory held that emotional damage was caused in a
child when the parent-child relationship was disrupted.28 There-
fore, state agencies and courts preferred permanent placement
with a family, either biological or adoptive, over long periods of
drift in a middle ground such as foster care. The plan would
remove children "trapped in the system."29
Under the AACWA, states were to use "reasonable efforts" to
reunify families. Such efforts were to include various social ser-
vices provided by the states. In hindsight, the nearly universally
accepted failure of the AACWA was in not defining what "reason-
able efforts" meant. In Del A. v. Roemer, a federal district court
held that the "reasonable efforts" requirement was unenforce-
able due to vagueness.3 ° Further, the Supreme Court held that
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the requirement did not confer to indi-
vidual parents a private right of action where it was alleged that
the state did not make reasonable efforts.Si
In the end, states were left with little guidance as to the fed-
eral policy of "reasonable efforts." This troubled many observers
when difficult cases became publicized and when the number of
foster children increased as more children entered the system
than left it each year. 32 Highly publicized child deaths led fed-
eral lawmakers to seek clarification of, and, for some types of
cases, removal of the "reasonable efforts" requirement.3 3 Thus,
under the Clinton administration, the ASFA passed both houses
of Congress with significant bi-partisan support.
34
III. PERMANENCY POLICY UNDER THE ASFA
The changes in policy under ASFA are significant, discrimi-
nating against poor families by unnecessarily limiting the time in
which children may stay in foster care before the state must file a
28. See O'Flynn, supra note 20, at 251.
29. Id. at 250.
30. 777 F. Supp. 1297, 1308 (E.D. La. 1991).
31. See Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 363-64 (1992). See Kim, supra
note 4, at 296-97; see also Charlie H. v. Whitman, 83 F. Supp. 2d 476, 483 (2000)
(holding "[42 U.S.C.] §671(a)(15) [does] not unambiguously confer an
enforceable right on individual children within the child welfare system
because only 'a rather generalized duty' [is] imposed upon the state, 'to be
enforced not by private individuals but by the Secretary of [Health and Human
Services] '").
32. See O'Flynn, supra note 20, at 254.
33. See id. at 253 n.71.
34. See Gordon, supra note 6; see also Pagano, supra note 21, at 242 (noting
the possible influence of, among other sources, HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, IT
TAKES A VILLAGE: AND OTHER LESSONS CHILDREN TEACH Us (1996)).
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petition for termination. A review of the history of state interven-
tion into matters of the family shows that the ASFA's threat to
poor families is not unique to American social welfare policy.
But the threat to break up poor families prematurely is nonethe-
less alarming when we look at the implications of such a
structure.
A. A History of Parental Rights in the United States
The story of the relationship between parents, children, and
society is one that, when followed, tells much of the story of
American social theory. This is largely true because these mat-
ters are so fundamental to who we are as a culture. In the colo-
nial period, there was a general sense in law and culture that
fathers and children were analogous to masters and slaves,
respectively. Indeed the father had legal right to the children as
his property, and the wife occupied a secondary position, con-
centrating her efforts on "reverence and respect 35 after the Pau-
line Biblical model.36
A second phase in American family law policy was the trans-
fer to custody law centered on the mother. As the nineteenth
century moved forward, this was the controlling legal norm.
American society concentrated on moral and educational devel-
opment, and the prevailing view was that women, specifically
mothers, were responsible for their children's growth in this
regard. Therefore, the best interests of the child became ajudi-
cially recognized concept," as did a preference for the mother in
custodial cases because she was the nurturing agent.38 Parental
unfitness was usually a determination made, however, only upon
showing of moral unfitness rather than financial limitations,
which now leads to what may constitute neglect in some states.3 9
This was a time in which Jacksonian Democracy gave way to Whig
values of economic and social progress through national, benevo-
lent societies for moral reform, such as temperance societies,
35. See generally MARY ANNE MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHIL-
DREN'S RIGHTS: THE HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES 1-47
(1994).
36. See EPHESIANS 6:1-9.
37. See MASON, supra note 35, at 62 n.65 (citing State v. Baird and Torrey,
21 N.J. Eq. 384 (1869); and Gishwiler v. Dodez, 4 Ohio St. 615 (1855)).
38. See MASON, supra note 35, at 49-83.
39. See id. at 63 n.67 (citing Lindsay v. Lindsay, 14 Ga. 657, *1 (1854);
Kremelberg v. Kremelberg, 52 Md. 553, *7 (1879); Crimmins v. Crimmins, 64
How. Pr. 103, *1 (N.Y. 1882); Jackson v. Jackson, 80 Or. 402, 402-03 (1880);
Helden v. Helden, 7 Wis. 256, *4 (1858)).
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abolition movements, insane asylums, orphanages, and the like.4"
These efforts were especially targeted at Catholic immigrants,
who were seen as especially given to wine. Some benevolence
and political groups, for example, warned of the twin evils of
"Rum and Romanism."41 Anti-Masonry in the 1830s and 1840s
and Anti-Catholic efforts with the rise of the Know-Nothings
(American Party) in the early 1850s also paralleled movements
toward social engineering, as white Protestants sought to main-
tain an orderly culture.
A third phase in American family law incorporated a set of
principles consistent with the trends of the Progressive Era. The
age of the American industrial revolution brought a division of
labor and management that came with the rise of the corpora-
tion and brought an increased division of labor (along with
much of society) into groups of specialization. Along with these
trends, American culture, including the courts and legislatures,
came to rely increasingly on the advice and counsel of experts,
who would develop enlightened and efficient plans with which to
engineer the complex society toward increased productivity and
collective wealth. These trends entered the world of family law
through cases and statutes that signified a phenomenon that one
scholar calls "The State as Superparent."42 The Progressive Era
cannot be overemphasized as the signal of change toward the
modern period wherein American society has removed morality
from conceptions of child welfare and now concentrate on
bureaucrats and local experts and caseworkers to tell us where to
draw the line. As one scholar summarizes:
Beginning in the Progressive era the new social science
theory that poverty was not a symptom of a corrupt or
criminal character encouraged the state to provide finan-
cial support to poor parents to maintain their children
rather than removing them. At the same time scientific
concepts of proper child raising provided the state with
authority to remove children from their homes when
parental behavior fell below acceptable standards.43
40. See HARRY L. WATSON, LIBERTY AND POWER: THE POLITICS OF JACKSO-
NIAN AMERICA 132-71 (1990); Paul Anthony Wilhelm, A Victim of Sectional
Theologies: Parochial Schools of the Presbyterian Church in the Crossfire
between Charles Hodge and James Henley Thornwell 40-45 (1999) (unpub-
lished M.A. Thesis, Vanderbilt University) (on file with the Vanderbilt Divinity
Library and the author).
41. See generally RONALD G. WALTERS, AMERICAN REFORMERS: 1815-1860, at
21-38 (1978).
42. See generally MASON, supra note 35, at 85-119.
43. Id. at 161.
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It was during this period that social work and other careers
devoted to the scientific study of poverty and other social condi-
tions, along with the rise of anthropology, psychology, and sociol-
ogy in the university created a new set of institutions upon which
modern welfare and family policies were based.
The 1960s saw the rise of the child-based legal concepts as
the concepts of feminism and children's rights arose in opposi-
tion to long accepted patriarchal norms. The numbers of
divorce and the numbers of families determined to be in poverty
rose sharply in the 1960s to the 1990s, bringing about custody
battles and termination proceedings.44 Governments at the state
and local levels have developed complex frameworks for deter-
mining whether children are in danger at home, whether par-
ents may retain rights to their children, and how long and how
diligently the state must act in efforts to reunify families on the
brink of permanent separation.
B. Modern Welfare Law and Federalization
Under the broad reach of the Commerce Clause, the federal
interest in welfare programs since the late 1960s has translated
into statutory guidelines for family law, including termination
proceedings, as reflected first in the AAWCA and now in the
ASFA. Some authors have noted that the nationalization of fam-
ily law has brought increased invasion of privacy and has at times
codified political stigmatization. From attacks on "welfare
queens" to "deadbeat dads," national welfare and family law has
reflected crusades against popular political monsters.45 One
scholar highlights the growing intrusions on privacy that are now
associated with modern federal welfare policy:
In the welfare realm, realization of the right of parental
autonomy is not automatic. Unlike the rest of the commu-
nity, welfare parents are not afforded broad authority over
their children's upbringing. For them, there is no assump-
tion of parental fitness; to the contrary, there is a presump-
tion that children in welfare families are in need of state
supervision. Governmental oversight is accomplished in
44. See id. at 121.
45. See Tonya L. Brito, The Welfarization of Family Law, 48 U. KAN. L. REv.
229, 263-64 (2000). Historians have commonly noted the American search for
political monsters, beginning with Andrew Jackson's crusade against the Bank
of the United States, and then Masonry, Roman Catholicism, slavery, immigrant
ignorance, child labor, nuclear weapons, and abortion/lack of reproductive
choice. For the antebellum period and the origins of these crusades, see gener-
ally WALTERS, supra note 41; WATSON, supra note 40, andJ. MILLS THORNTON III,
POLITICS AND POWER IN A SLAVE SocIET.: AL.AMAm 1800-1860 (1978).
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part through the use of Individual Responsibility Agree-
ments (IRAs), which are perhaps the most striking evi-
dence of state intrusiveness in the parenting domain. IRAs
are documents used by welfare agencies to set forth the
family-life obligations that the state requires welfare par-
ents to fulfill. The Personal Responsibility Act identifies a
list of family obligations that may be included on the form,
"includ[ing] a requirement that the individual ...keep
school age children in school, immunize children, and
attend parenting and money management classes."
4 6
This trend is especially troubling insofar as it affects involuntary
termination proceedings, where a family is torn apart perma-
nently so a child may be freely moved to an adoptive home.
Some attention also has been given to the idea of federal intru-
sion into any matters of family law. In United States v. Lopez , 47 the
Supreme Court struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of
1990 as unconstitutional in part on the grounds that the federal
government may not interfere with matters of the family.48
Nevertheless, the federal government has had increased
influence over state family and welfare policy through federal
grants conditioned on state plans that follow federal guidelines.4 9
Congress has provided significant financial incentives for states
to fall into line with whatever policy is politically expedient. In a
one-size-fits-all approach, the federal government, in the name of
uniformity, has now exercised its will on a matter traditionally
held by the states, by making federal money contingent on case
workers lowering their diligence efforts, or at least persisting in
those efforts for less time. When a child's health or safety is in
danger, states are closer to the scene of events that may lead up
to termination and should be given maximum leeway when it
comes to guidelines for the ultimate remedy of termination.
States should also be more empowered to determine their inter-
pretation of the proper balance between parental rights and the
health and safety of children.
C. New Guidelines Under the ASFA
The ASFA clarified the "reasonable efforts" requirement
under the AACWA, a requirement which had been seriously
46. Brito, supra note 45, at 246 (footnote omitted).
47. 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
48. See Laura W. Morgan, The Federalization of Child Support-A Shift in the
Ruling Paradigm: Child Support as Outside the Contours of "Family Law, " 16 J. AM.
AcAD. MATRIMONIAL LAw 195, 195 (1999).
49. See generally Brito, supra note 45; Morgan, supra note 48.
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maligned by the time the ASFA was passed.5" Stories of violence
perpetrated upon children who returned home from foster care
under the AACWA policies lent fuel to those who sought an over-
haul of the foster care system, which many felt was already a hold-
ing tank for too many children with no hope of becoming less
crowded.51 One scholar recalls: "The congressional testimony
and newspaper articles during the pre-ASFA hearings empha-
sized cases of children who were returned home and killed, 52
noting also the influence of a book by Richard Gelles of the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania, which detailed how a child reunited with
his mother was thereafter suffocated.53
The ASFA provides that the state need not always use reason-
able efforts, namely in cases wherein violence is attributed
against the parent.54 While this provision generally is not contro-
versial and has made useful clarification in the law, one provision
of this section of the Act gives moment to pause. The Act creates
an exception to reasonable efforts wherever the parent has previ-
ously had his or her parental rights terminated with regard to a
sibling.5 In other words, the statute has a built-in partial adjudi-
cation against a parent with regard to one child based on a prior
adjudication with regard to a sibling of that child. This excep-
tion has, as a youth expert noted early on, the effect that "a par-
ent whose rights to another child were terminated when the
parent was a teenager, for example, would be deprived of ser-
vices even though, when the parent was older and more mature,
reunification efforts might be appropriate."56
As far as poor families are concerned, the most significant
piece of the ASFA structure is the time limits imposed on foster
care before a state must file a petition for termination. Under
the ASFA, federal law imposes a requirement upon states that
want to receive federal funds for foster care. In order to receive
such funds, the state's plan must provide that if the child has
50. See generally Kim, supra note 4, at 296-309.
51. See Roberts, supra note 6, at 66.
52. Id.
53. Id. (citing RIcHAR GELLES, THE BOOK OF DAviD: How PRESERVING
FAMILIES CAN COST CHILDREN'S LIVEs (1996)).
54. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 671(a)(15)(D) (West Supp. 1998); see also Pagano,
supra note 21, at 245.
55. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 671(a) (15) (D) (iii) (West Supp. 1998); see also
Pagano, supra note 21, at 245.
56. Bill Grimm, ASFA Brings Big Changes, YOUTH LAW NEWS, Nov./Dec.
1997, at 3 (cited by Pagano, supra note 21, at 245 n.28); but see Kathleen Hag-
gard, Note, Treating Prior Terminations of Parental Rights as Grounds for Present
Terminations, 73 WASH. L. REV. 1051 (1998) (arguing that the current protec-
tions for parents are sufficient, at least in the State of Washington).
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spent fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months in foster care,
the state shall file a petition for termination.
5 7
This guideline is most troublesome in light of the fact that
from the outset, the AAWCA envisioned providing states with
money toward foster care and other services. It encouraged
states to make up the services with their own welfare policies to
handle cases of neglect due to poverty. The new guidelines make
sense only where the history of violence does not compel the
state to make reasonable efforts. Parents should not be given
unlimited chances, and children should not be exposed to immi-
nent danger. However, the time provision is very troublesome
because of its effects on poor families who have had their chil-
dren placed into foster care, voluntarily or otherwise, due to
inability to provide for the children or due to allegations of neg-
lect. To the extent that welfare programs or a minimum-wage
income of a single parent provides inadequate resources, poor
single mothers, once children are taken into foster care, may not
be able to provide a proper home and proper supervision to the
satisfaction of local caseworkers and judges within a mere fifteen
months.
D. Implications: the Cases of Neglect
Inadequate food, shelter, clothing, and hygiene are among
the types of things for which a state, without regard to the
intent/willfulness of the parents, may remove a child on the
grounds of neglect, pursuant to its termination statutes.5 8 These
are all symptoms of poverty. While states have nearly universally
held that more than a mere showing of poverty is needed when a
state seeks termination,59 the reality may indeed be otherwise.6"
Indeed, North Dakota, for example, appears to require only a
three-part test showing that the child is deprived and that such
deprivation is likely to continue causing serious harm.6
57. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5) (E) (2001); see also N.D. CEr. CODE § 27-20-44
(2001) (measuring this time limit in terms of days rather than months (450 of
the last 660 days)).
58. See generally, supra note 16 and statutes cited therein.
59. See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 625.090(2) (g); Department of Human
Resources v. Moore, 552 S.W.2d 672 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that for a
state agency to succeed in termination of parental rights it must show more
than the existence of poverty).
60. See generally Theresa D. Legere, Note, Preventing Judicially Mandated
Orphans, 38 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REv. 260 (2000).
61. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-44(1)(b)(2000); Interest of S.F., 615 N.W.2d
511 (N.D. 2000) (holding that in determining the likelihood of continuing dep-
rivation, a court may consider parental cooperation with social service agen-
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Neglect is the primary reason children enter the foster care
62system. 2 One commentator estimates that as few as "ten percent
of the children in foster care are there because of serious
abuse." 63 But the ASFA targeted the relatively few cases of vio-
lence and abuse, rather than addressing the problems of families
entrenched in poverty. Several authors have touted the ASFA for
its clarification of the reasonable efforts requirements.6" Many
more, however, have rightly noted that its shortcomings include
lack of concern for the special circumstances of poor families
accused of neglect.65 With the rise in divorce, single parenting,
and homelessness, there is an increase in situations in which,
what the state recognizes as "neglect" occurs on the basis of, in
large part, poverty.66
Authors have also analyzed the combined racial and class
implications of the new policy under ASFA.67 While a half a mil-
lion children are in foster care,68 this number is composed of a
large percentage of Black and poor children.69 One scholar
strongly asserts: "If an outsider looked at the American child wel-
fare system, she would likely conclude that this is not a system
designed to promote the welfare of America's children. Rather,
it is a system designed to regulate, monitor, and punish poor
families, especially poor Black families."7 ° Since poor Black fami-
lies compose a portion of the child foster care and child welfare
systems, one can readily see the disparate impact ASFA's fifteen-
cies); Interest of D.F.G., 602 N.W.2d 697 (N.D. 1999) (state must prove factors
by clear and convincing evidence).
62. See O'Flynn, supra note 20, at 243 (citing U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, GAO/HEHS 9840, PARENTAL SUBSTANCE ABUSE IMPLICATIONS FOR CHIL-
DREN, THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM, AND FOSTER CARE OUTCOMES 4 (1997); see
also Roberts, supra note 6, at 68-69 (citing Duncan Lindsey, THE WELFARE OF
CHILDREN 139-56 (1994); Alex Morales, Seeking a Cure for Child Abuse, USA
TODAY, Sept. 1998, at 34).
63. Martin Guggenheim, The Foster Care Dilemma and What to Do About It: Is
the Problem That Too Many Children Are Not Being Adopted Out of Foster Care or That
Too Many Children Are Entering Foster Care?, 2 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 141, 147 (1999)
(citing Kathleen A. Bailie, Note, The Other "Neglected" Parties in Child Protective
Proceedings: Parents in Poverty and the Role of the Lawyers Who Represent Them, 66
FoRDHAm L. REV. 2285, 2317 (1998)).
64. See generally Haggard, supra note 56; Kim, supra note 4.
65. See generally Legere, supra note 60; Gordon, supra note 6; Roberts,
supra note 6; O'Flynn, supra note 20.
66. See generally CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, THE HOMELESS (1994).
67. See generally Roberts, supra note 6.
68. See generally id.
69. See RENNY GOLDEN, DISPOSABLE CHILDREN: AMERICA'S CHILD WELFARE
SYSTEM 17 (1997) (cited in Roberts, supra note 6, n.6).
70. Roberts, supra note 6, at 64.
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month provision has effected on Blacks.7 1 Public policy should
not allow children to keep being fed into the foster care system at
alarming rates, with efforts centered on expediting them out into
new families rather than on reunification. As an old Georgia
case noted:
The rich can not say to the lowly, "You are poor and have
many children. I am rich and have none. You are
unlearned and live in a cabin. I am learned and live in a
mansion. Let the State take one of your children and give
it a better home with me. I will rear it better than you
can." The hovel has its rights as well as the palace. The
ties of motherhood too are not to be lightly disregarded.
... [T] he deepest, the tenderest, the most unswerving and
unfaltering thing on earth is the love of a mother for her
child. The love of a good mother is the holiest thing this
side of heaven.
72
Some recent cases and legislation allow us to see some actual and
presumed effects of ASFA's fifteen-month provision on poor fam-
ilies who are facing termination for neglect associated with
poverty.
IV. RECENT CASES
A. Procedural Due Process-A Viable Challenge?
One of the most significant constitutional cases touching the
termination of parental rights has been M.L.B. v. S.L.J 73 In this
case appealed from the Mississippi Supreme Court, the United
States Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment
does not allow a state to condition appeal from a termination
proceeding on an indigent parent's inability to pay for transcript
fees where the transcript is necessary for the appeal. 4 In a rare
grant of certiorari in this area of law, the Court took the opportu-
nity to recount the string of cases in which the Court had upheld
family rights as among the most sacred rights receiving constitu-
tional protection. The Supreme Court recognized in M.L.B. that
the parent-child bond is among the most sacred relationships
recognized by our society. The Court summarized: "Choices
71. This may or may not cause ASFA to be unconstitutional, as applied to
indigent individuals. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding
that, under purposeful discrimination doctrine, if disparate impact along racial
lines is explainable on non-racial grounds then the law is not unconstitutional).
72. Moore v. Dozier, 128 Ga. 90, 92-93, 57 S.E. 110, 111 (1907) (quoted
in MASON, supra note 35, at 86).
73. 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
74. Id. at 128.
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about marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children are
among associational rights this Court has ranked as 'of basic
importance in our society' . . . rights sheltered by the Fourteenth
Amendment against the State's unwarranted usurpation, disre-
gard, or disrespect."75
In striking down the provision that only allowed indigent
criminal defendants to obtain a free transcript, the Court noted
that the gravity of the sanction in a termination case is similar to
that of a criminal one, calling the process "quasi criminal in
nature."76 The Court equated termination to a criminal punish-
ment because, unlike loss of custody, termination is an irrevoca-
ble and total separation of one of the most fundamental
relationships and "it leaves the parent with no right to visit or
communicate with the child."77
As noted above, Washington v. Davis likely does not permit
ASFA to be held unconstitutional on the basis of racial criteria.78
But the Court in M.L.B. held that statutes may be unconstitu-
tional where the sanctions treat indigents differently than non-
indigents and the sanctions apply to "all indigents and do not
reach anyone outside that class."79 If it is found that parents fac-
ing termination cannot meet ASFA's mandated state require-
ments imposed by caseworkers and family courts because of
poverty, the Court's holding in M.L.B. holding may reach some
provisions of ASFA, particularly the fifteen month provision.
Published case law on terminations is rare. Looking at the
relatively few published cases at the state level, one can see the
fragility of the indigent parent's position in termination proceed-
ings. The potential lack of procedural due process, the increased
power of the individual caseworker (need for compliance with a
caseworker's plan), and the vague concepts of "substantial pro-
gress" toward a case plan and "reasonable expectation" that the
parent will provide "proper care and custody" all illustrate the
legal difficulties faced by poor parents. Judges rely increasingly
on the determinations made by caseworkers. At the same time,
75. Id. at 116 (citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971);
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)
and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (raising children)).
76. 519 U.S. at 124 (citing Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 196 (1971)).
77. Id. at 118 (citing Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 39
(1981) (BlackmunJ., dissenting)).
78. See Roberts, supra note 6, at 64.
79. 519 U.S. at 126-27 (citing Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 242
(1970)).
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caseworkers are being told under ASFA that "reasonable efforts"
toward reunification are not to exceed fifteen months before
they shall file a petition for termination. In light of M.L.B., these
problems, and their particular application to the poor, call into
question the constitutionality of the fifteen-month provision and
perhaps other provisions of ASFA on the basis of procedural due
process.
A recent challenge to the premature termination of parental
rights has been that of procedural due process. This claim arises
from the Supreme Court's holding in Santosky v. Kramer, which
involved a State of New York termination after a parent was
found neglectful.8 0 New York had required that only a "fair pre-
ponderance of the evidence" support the finding that a child is
permanently neglected. The Court held: "[b]efore a State may
sever completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their
natural child, due process requires that the State support its alle-
gations by at least clear and convincing evidence.""1 Another
case recognizing the severity of the termination proceeding was
Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.,82 decided one year before Santosky.
This case held that appointed counsel would be required
depending on the severity of the case, but the Court noted that
the parent's interest was very powerful against the govern-
ment's.8 3 A decision against the parent is "not simply to
infringe" on his interest, "but to end it." 4 It is in following this
reasoning that the Supreme Court in Lassiter, Santosky, and
M.L.B. agreed-even the dissenters-that the parent-child rela-
tionship deserves Fourteenth Amendment protection.85
Various claims by parents have alleged that termination was
in violation of procedural due process or that termination was
ordered because of poverty. 6 These claims are almost always
unsuccessful, as in In Re Michael M.S., a recent Wisconsin case.
There, the court applied the standard that the mother had
ample notice of termination and after "diligent efforts" by the
state, the mother had failed to make substantial progress toward
the fulfillment of a case plan. The court's reasoning was based in
80. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
81. Id. at 747.
82. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
83. See id. at 27.
84. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 118.
85. See id. at 119; (citing Santosky, 455 U.S. at 774 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting)).
86. See, e.g., In re Michael M.S., 608 N.W.2d 438 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999)
(unpublished opinion) (order for termination upheld despite claims of due
process violations and claims that poverty was the reason for termination).
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large part on the fact that the mother did not choose the cheap-
est housing available and did not demonstrate substantial pro-
gress toward the case plan of achieving suitable housing,
attaining a telephone, and attending counseling. While the facts
of this case were not entirely on the side of the mother, the rea-
soning of the court reveals the micro-managing into which
caseworkers and courts together engage in engineering socially
acceptable outcomes. Families are thus permanently severed in
the name of the child's best interest because a judge or jury was
not convinced that the case plan has been met (or in this case,
"substantial progress" made toward it).
In Michigan, the recent case of In re Trejo also raises a num-
ber of concerns.87 The mother in this case also asserted a proce-
dural due process challenge, here, to the MCL 712A.19b(5),
which makes termination mandatory (unless in the child's best
interest) if the petitioner demonstrates a ground for termination
under § 19b(3). This statute justifies termination where the peti-
tioner shows that the parent has failed to remedy conditions for
which the child was removed into foster care or shows that "the
parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or
custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that
the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within
a reasonable time considering the child's age. 88 While the court
upheld the constitutionality of this statute, the dissent points out
how thin the thread is that separates maintenance of the family
from permanent break-up by termination of rights. The dissent
points out that "she complied with most of these steps [as
required by the Department of Social Services]." The court fur-
ther found that the termination at the probate court level was
based on incomplete evidence supplied by a single caseworker
who had "indicated" that the housing was still unsuitable, while
she had not even seen the mother's housing situation at the time
of the termination hearing.8" The dissent concluded by noting
that "the fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the
care, custody, and management of their children does not evapo-
rate simply because they have not been model parents or have
lost temporary custody of their children to the State."'
The outcome in Trejo illustrates the thin ice upon which
poor parents skate when faced with termination. The new
87. In re Trejo, 612 N.W.2d 407 (Mich. 2000).
88. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.19b(3) (g) (cited in In re Trejo, 612
N.W.2d at 416-17).
89. In re Trejo, 612 N.W.2d at 421 (Cavanagh, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
90. Id. at 422 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)).
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requirements of ASFA had not even been relevant to this deter-
mination, but would have placed the mother in even greater
jeopardy by requiring her to defend another petition, assuming
her children remained in foster care-for any reason-for fifteen
out of twenty-two months. Poor parents, whose decisions on
which apartment to take can affect their rights to their children
forever, do not need this extra intrusion into their lives. It is
unlikely that it serves the interests of the children any more than
previous law; ASFA merely expedites more children's termina-
tion to free them up for another family to take them through
adoption.
Some hope is presented by courts, as the dissent in Trejo did,
attributing high value to parental rights and looking at the total-
ity of the circumstances in termination cases. In a bold state-
ment, a Louisiana appellate court has declared that:
'Environmental neglect' such as lack of adequate food,
shelter or clothing and inadequate supervision is a
resource problem and not indicia of abusive or neglectful
parents .... These problems could be readily addressed
by increasing the financial resources available to the fam-
ily. The Department did not provide guidance to Ms. Wal-
ters in securing the resources she apparently lacked.
Instead, the Department demanded that she improve her
station in life by conforming to their lofty expectations in a
vast array of areas.9 '
The court went on to note that, "[t]here is a strong correlation
between a family's poverty and allegations of abuse and neglect
foreshadowing a petition to terminate parental rights."9 2 In this
case, the court noted that the Department did not provide ser-
vices necessary to meet the goals they had established for the par-
ent. The court rightly criticized the double standard imposed by
the state here.
If there is hope for the ASFA, it is in the action of courts
such as these, who place parental rights among the most funda-
mental, and do not see a compelling state interest (in removal of
the child) around every corner. Relying heavily on the Supreme
Court's holding in Santosky, the Louisiana court here noted,
"Removing children from their parents and family because of
poverty creates socio-economic bias vis-a-vis parental rights. With
91. State ex rel. S.M.W., 771 So.2d 160, 170 (La. Ct. App. 2000), rev'd, 781
So.2d 1223 (La. 2001) (citing Naomi R. Cahn, Welfare Reform and the Juvenile
Courts: Children's Interests in a Familial Context: Poverty, Foster Care, and Adoption, 60
OHIO ST. L.J. 1189 (1999)).
92. Id. at 171 (citing Cahn, supra note 91; Bailie, supra note 63).
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increasing frequency, termination proceedings are subject to cul-
tural and class biases because the parents subject to termination
proceedings are often poor, uneducated, or members of minor-
ity groups. ' 93 While the court is not suggesting that children are
being removed for poverty alone, it is suggesting that the factors
concomitant to poverty often cause state agencies to step in
unnecessarily and perform social engineering at the expense of
the natural, or original, family. The court here mirrors criticisms
levied by many family law observers.94 Legislators would be well
advised to listen to these warnings in the refining of family law
policy. In this case, however, the Louisiana Supreme Court
reversed the lower court, finding that according to the experts
consulted, the mother had demonstrated an inability to reform
her conduct in the near future. The Louisiana Supreme Court
rejected the poverty argument made by the appellate court.95
B. A Breakthrough in Illinois-Substantive Due Process
The Illinois Supreme Court has recently invalidated a por-
tion of the state's adoption law. The invalidated provision pro-
vided that a parent would be presumed unfit for purposes of
terminating parental rights if the child has been in foster care for
fifteen out of any twenty-two successive months.96 Illinois, like
most states, had incorporated such a provision pursuant to the
ASFA guidelines required for federal funds. The court held in In
re H. G.,9 7 that the fifteen-month provision of the Illinois Adop-
tion Act was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment
and the Illinois Constitution, as it violated substantive due pro-
cess. The court focused on the inability of parents with sub-
stance abuse problems to meet the requirements of the
caseworkers and to achieve reunification before the end of fif-
teen months. Due to the fundamental liberty interest, the court
applied strict scrutiny and narrow tailoring analysis. Ultimately,
the court held that the fifteen-month presumption of unfitness
was not narrowly tailored to the purpose of identifying parents
who posed a risk of health or safety to their children: " [i] n many
cases, the length of a child's stay in foster care has nothing to do
with the parent's ability or inability to safely care for the child
93. Id. at 168 (citing Santosky, 455 U.S. 745 (1982)).
94. See generally Roberts, supra note 6.
95. State ex rel. S.M.W., 781 So.2d 1223, 1234-35 (La. 2001).
96. See 750 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 50/1(D) (m-1) (2001).
97. In re H.G., 757 N.E.2d 864 (Ill. 2001) (holding that the fifteen-month
provision of the Illinois Adoption Act, 750 ILL. CoMp. STAT. 50/1(D)(m-
1) (2001), was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Illi-
nois Constitution, as it violated substantive due process).
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but, instead, is due to circumstances beyond the parent's con-
trol."9 8 Thus, the court struck down the provision as a violation
of substantive due process.
The Illinois court vindicated the arguments of O'Flynn, call-
ing for reform due to the unfair impact of ASFA provisions on
parents in recovery from substance abuse problems.99 But the
court's holding may not be limited to claims of substantive due
process based on substance abuse. Indeed, the court cited the
facts of the case, in which a parent was in recovery, as merely one
example of the types of "circumstances beyond the parent's con-
trol," noting that the facts of this case "illustrate [d]" the court's
general point that the fifteen-month unfitness presumption
failed narrow tailoring.'00 The court found that it is unfair to
presume the parents "unfit" simply because they are not reunited
with the subject child within the time constraints, because many
reasons having nothing to do with fitness or unfitness can keep a
parent from reunification. Since the court recognized that many
neutral circumstances can prevent reunification, this case may
provide grounds for a challenge by indigent parents. On either
procedural or substantive due process grounds, poor parents
who are failing to meet caseworker requirements for reunifica-
tion within the fifteen months may now have solid ground on
which to challenge the constitutionality of this portion of the
ASFA.
C. Other Observations
The ASFA created a vastly increased set of demands on state
courts that the Act simply did not address.' 0 ' Some argue that
the ASFA has "the potential for increasing the number of 'legal
orphans,' and the unintended consequence of leaving even more
children 'drifting' in foster care."
10 2
98. 757 N.E.2d at 872.
99. See generally O'Flynn, supra note 20.
100. See 757 N.E.2d at 872.
101. Prepared Testimony by the Honorable Robert C. Leuba, Chief Court Adminis-
trator, Supreme Court of Connecticut on Behalf ofthe Conference of State Court Adminis-
trators: Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means Subcomm. on Human Resources,
106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Hon. Robert C. Leuba before House Sub-
comm. on Human Resources).
102. Jan L. Hagen, Critical Perspectives on Social Welfare: Challenges and Con-
troversies, FAMILIES IN SOCIETY- THEJOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY HUMAN SERVICES,
Nov. 1, 2000, no. 6, vol. 81, at 555 (citing Theodore J. Stein, The Adoption and
Safe Families Act: Creating a False Dichotomy Between Parents' and Children's Rights,
FAMILIES IN SOCIETY- THE JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY HUMAN SERVICES, Nov. 1,
2000, no. 6, vol. 81, at 586).
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In response to requests for additional training and technical
assistance to deal with increased caseloads, Congress recently
enacted legislation, shoring up the court system to provide for
the number of children in the foster care system.' 0 3 The pur-
pose of the Strengthening Abuse and Neglect Courts Act of 2000
is "to improve the administrative efficiency and effectiveness of
the Nation's abuse and neglect courts and for other purposes
consistent with the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997. ' 4
The statute posits that, inter alia:
Improved computerized case-tracking systems, comprehen-
sive training, and development of, and education on,
model abuse and neglect court systems, particularly with
respect to underserved areas, would significantly further
the purposes of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of
1997 by reducing the average length of an abused and
neglected child's stay in foster care, improving the quality
of decision-making and court services provided to children
and families, and increasing the number of adoptions.
10 5
Congress has now provided the technological assistance to make
the permanency determinations occur more quickly in the back-
logged system. This goal of efficiency is not at all objectionable,
but this new statute warns us that the process will be more expe-
ditious and the effects of ASFA will soon be felt in some areas as
yet untouched. Congress appears not to have responded to the
legal community's criticism of the ASFA, but instead Congress
has gone forward to streamline the process even further with the
goal to move children along as fast as possible. This streamlining
is certainly needed, because ASFA has imposed a heavy burden
on family courts and lawyers, especially with the quicker and
more numerous filing of termination petitions. 106 This approach
is laudable for those who buy into the reasoning, goals, and
methods of the ASFA, and is frightening to those who see the
ASFA as contributing to the premature break-up of families.
The ASFA structure has its good points. When determining
child placement, the state is to give preference "to an adult rela-
tive over a non-related caregiver."' 7 The Act also provides incen-
tives to states where parental rights have been terminated in
order to expedite children out of the foster care system when it is
103. See Strengthening Abuse and Neglect Courts Act of 2000, Pub. L.
No. 106-314 (2000), 114 Stat. 1266 (2000).
104. See S. 2272, 106th Cong. (2000).
105. Pub. L. No. 106-314, at 2 ( 12) (2000).
106. See John Caher, Lawyers Adjust to New Burdens of Adoption Law, N.Y.
L.J., July 21, 2000.
107. 42 U.S.C.A. § 671(a)(19) (West Supp. 1998).
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determined that they may leave.' 0 8 But the main problem with
the ASFA, as noted above, is its time limits on foster care (the
fifteen-month provision) before a termination petition must be
filed. This provision puts poor families, who are already on their
heels, even more on the defensive. Moreover, the provision sub-
jects them to additional state intrusion, unnecessarily threaten-
ing poor families with the possibility of losing their children
forever.
There has been some doubt about ASFA's efficiency and its
effectiveness in permanently placing significantly more foster
children in adoptive homes. Health and Human Services Secre-
tary (HHS) Donna E. Shalala proudly announced in September
2000 that 46,000 foster care children had been legally adopted in
1999 (over the target of 41,000 and sixty-four percent increase
over the 28,000 adoptions legalized in 1996-the year before
ASFA). 09 However, the average increase since ASFA's adoption
"equals fewer than 1.1% of the total number of children in foster
care on any given day."' 0 One report criticized ASFA: "[ejven as
it encouraged adoption, ASFA made it easier than ever before to
take children from their parents just because their parents are
poor."111 Richard Wexler, Executive Director of the National
Coalition for Child Protection Reform, charged HHS with telling
only half the story. He alleged that ASFA "is creating a genera-
tion of legal orphans. Though HHS is quick to tell us how many
children have been adopted, they don't say how many more chil-
dren had all legal rights to their parents severed with no hope of
ever finding an adoptive home. State figures suggest that num-
ber is alarming."
11 2
In the end, ASFA structure has created a number of practi-
cal problems, and it may well be infringing on the procedural
and substantive due process rights of poor parents. In light of
M.L.B. and In re H.G., the constitutionality of some of the ASFA
provisions is in doubt. Do the ASFA's shortcomings reach the
required level announced in M.L.B., that the sanctions apply
solely to indigents? 13 As noted above, this question applied to
neglect and not to abuse cases. Where "neglect" is based in large
part on poverty, the fifteen-month sanction may qualify as reach-
108. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 670 (West Supp. 1998).
109. See HHS Awards Adoption Bonuses and Grants, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Sept. 20,
2000.
110. See NCCPR. New Numbers Show Failure of Federal Adoption Law, PR NEW-
swIRi, Sept. 21, 2000.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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ing indigents only. Indeed, to remedy a neglect situation, it takes
money. When the single parent must work ajob paying too little
or one that is unstable, he may not be able to satisfy the
caseworker within fifteen months. Thus, on the basis of his pov-
erty, the parent-child relationship will have been placed into per-
manent jeopardy. The effect of ASFA's fifteen-month provision
as applied to poor parents in cases of neglect deserves a harder
look under M.L.B. Perhaps a more promising approach arises
from In re H.G."4 In declaring the fifteen-month provision
unconstitutional on substantive due process grounds, the Illinois
court has cast itself forward, in a sense bidding other states to
follow. In light of the similarity among state provisions, which
are based on the ASFA guidelines, many states can follow the Illi-
nois high court without much innovation. In re H. G. may be the
best hope in vindicating the claims of this Note.
V. THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES
The idea that parents have a fundamental liberty interest in
rearing their biological children is neither new, nor did the
Supreme Court validate the idea out of thin air. First, there are
sociological and psychological benefits to keeping a child a part
of his or her biological lineage-namely, a sense of belonging
and pride. There is also the notion that biological parents, espe-
cially mothers, have a natural bond with their children, having
participated in the creation of the life and, in the case of the
mother, having gone through the pains of childbirth. Thus, all
other things being equal, biological parents have a greater stake
in the child's development. In addition to psychological and
sociological justifications, religious conviction and principles also
may be instructive to the questions of family law that are raised by
the ASFA, especially termination of parental rights. Two tradi-
tions within Christianity, the Roman Catholic, and Reformed tra-
ditions, contain distinct but parallel teachings regarding the
family that may help refine our views on the degree of the funda-
mental right discussed in cases like Santosky and M.L.B. Both tra-
ditions conclude that parental rights are among the most
fundamental and sacred, and that the termination of parental
rights is to be a last resort if ever used by the state.
A. The Catholic Notion of Subsidiarity
The notion of subsidiarity, a concept not exclusive to the
Catholic tradition, but well-advanced by that tradition, has stood
114. 757 N.E.2d 864 (11. 2001).
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in opposition to the claims of the Progressive Era that the crea-
tion of bureaucracies and social engineering by experts are the
means to decrease social unrest and increase general happiness
in society. Beginning with Leo XIII in Rerum Novarum, the
Church spoke out amidst the Industrial Revolution and the Pro-
gressive Era, saying, in sum, that although the state may better
society, the notion that the family is prior to the state is one of
the most central themes of a Christian world-view. Thus, the fam-
ily should be the first source of social betterment, followed by
institutions most local to the problem being targeted, as they are
able to solve such problems.
11 5
This teaching was clarified in Pope John Paul II's encyclical,
Centesimus Annus, in which he explained:
If Pope Leo XIII calls upon the State to remedy the condi-
tion of the poor in accordance with justice, he does so
because of his timely awareness that the State has the duty
of watching over the common good and of ensuring that
every sector of social life, not excluding the economic one,
contributes to achieving that good, while respecting the
rightful autonomy of each sector. This should not however
lead us to think that Pope Leo expected the State to solve
every social problem. On the contrary, he frequently insists
on necessary limits to the State's intervention and on its
instrumental character, inasmuch as the individual, the
family and society are prior to the State, and inasmuch as
the State exists in order to protect their rights and not sti-
fle them."
16
Pope John Paul II noted a few years later: " [i] t is necessary to go
back to seeing the family as the sanctuary of life. The family is
indeed sacred: it is the place in which life-the gift of God-can
be properly welcomed and protected against the many attacks to
which it is exposed, and can develop in accordance with what
constitutes authentic human growth."'
1 7
In his proclamation of 1994, "The Year of the Family," Pope
John Paul II again underscored a concept of the family as
informed by Christianity:
Every effort should be made so that the family will be rec-
ognized as the primordial and, in a certain sense 'sover-
eign' society! The 'sovereignty' of the family is essential for
the good of society. A truly sovereign and spiritually vigor-
115. LEO XIII, RERUM NOVARum (1891).
116. JOHN PAUL II, CENTESIMUS ANNUS 11 (1991).
117. JOHN PAUL II, CENTESIMUS ANNUS 39 (1991) (emphasis in
original).
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ous nation is always made up of strong families who are
aware of their vocation and mission in history. The family
is at the heart of all these problems and tasks. To relegate
it to a subordinate or secondary role, excluding it from its
rightful position in society, would be to inflict grave harm
on the authentic growth of society as a whole.'
1 8
Subsidiarity has driven Catholic social teaching over the last 150
years, as the rise of the social sciences and other ways of engi-
neering human interaction have ascended.'" 9 This very high
view of the family as being "prior to the state" and "sacred" sup-
ports the argument that the state should take extreme measures
before breaking apart families permanently upon allegations of
neglect due to circumstances related to poverty. In addition, it
does not require citation to note that the Church has spoken out
consistently in favor of justice for the poor (through teachings
such as the preferential option for the poor), consistent with
Scripture: "[d]o not rob the poor because he is poor, Or crush
the afflicted at the gate; For the LoRD will plead their case, And
take the life of those who rob them." 2 °
B. The Reformed Theological View of Covenant
The Presbyterian and Reformed traditions are also instruc-
tive with regard to family law policy. This collective tradition,
perhaps more than any other Christian tradition, is the one that
most emphasizes family unity under God. The Westminster Con-
fession of Faith of 1647, the widely respected Presbyterian decla-
ration of Christian faith and practice, encourages the practice of
praying and worshipping together as a family, which unit the
Confession describes as a sort of church in itself.'2 1 Further,
Reformed churches strongly hold to the practice of infant bap-
tism."' The practice of infant baptism is central to Reformed
theology, distinguishing this tradition from Anabaptists and most
modem Baptists. This practice is supported by the notion that
God works in families, distributing grace (similar to the Catholic
view of families as "sacred," as expressed by the Pope).' 2 3 The
Hebrew practice of circumcision carried similar implications and
118. JOHN PAUL II, LETTER TO FAMILIES FROM POPE 17 (1994).
119. See MASON, supra note 35, at 161-85 (noting the rise of social sci-
ences with reference to family law).
120. PROVERBS 22:22-23.
121. THE WESTMINSTER CONFSSION OF FAITH XXI § 6 (1647), at http://
www.opc.org/documents/WCF-frames.html.
122. Id. at XXVIII § 4.
123. Id. The annotated version of the Confession reads, in the note to
XXVIII § 4, n.533:
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made a similar statement about the importance of family in
ancient Israelite religion.
In the realm of education, the Reformed tradition was quick
to develop its own theories on the role of the church and the
state. The tradition highly valued education as one of the most
central functions of some combination of the church, family, and
the state. However, in the Presbyterian Church in nineteenth
century America, churchmen on both sides of the debate held
that the position of the family was the indispensable compo-
nent. 124 In these ways, the Reformed tradition has shown an
Genesis 17:7, 9. And I will establish my covenant between me and thee
and thy seed after thee in their generations for an everlasting cove-
nant, to be a God unto thee, and to thy seed after thee .... And God
said unto Abraham, Thou shalt keep my covenant therefore, thou, and
thy seed after thee in their generations. Galatians 3:9, 14. So then they
which be of faith are blessed with faithful Abraham. . . . That the
blessing of Abraham might come on the Gentiles through Jesus Christ;
that we might receive the promise of the Spirit through faith. Colos-
sians 2:11-12. In whom also ye are circumcised with the circumcision
made without hands, in putting off the body of the sins of the flesh by
the circumcision of Christ: Buried with him in baptism, wherein also
ye are risen with him through the faith of the operation of God, who
hath raised him from the dead. Acts 2:38-39. Then Peter said unto
them, Repent, and be baptized every one of you in the name ofJesus
Christ for the remission of sins, and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy
Ghost. For the promise is unto you, and to your children, and to all
that are afar off, even as many as the Lord our God shall call. Romans
4:11-12. And he received the sign of circumcision, a seal of the right-
eousness of the faith which he had yet being uncircumcised: that he
might be the father of all them that believe, though they be not cir-
cumcised; that righteousness might be imputed unto them also: And
the father of circumcision to them who are not of the circumcision
only, but who also walk in the steps of that faith of our father Abra-
ham, which he had being yet uncircumcised. 1 Corinthians 7:14. For
the unbelieving husband is sanctified by the wife, and the unbelieving
wife is sanctified by the husband: else were your children unclean; but
now are they holy. Matthew 28:19. Go ye therefore, and teach all
nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son,
and of the Holy Ghost. Mark 10:13-16. And they brought young chil-
dren to him, that he should touch them: and his disciples rebuked
those that brought them. But when Jesus saw it, he was much dis-
pleased, and said unto them, Suffer the little children to come unto
me, and forbid them not: for of such is the kingdom of God. Verily I
say unto you, Whosoever shall not receive the kingdom of God as a
little child, he shall not enter therein. And he took them up in his
arms, put his hands upon them, and blessed them. Luke 18:15. And
they brought unto him also infants, that he would touch them: but
when his disciples saw it, they rebuked them.
THE WESTMINSTER CONFESSION, at http://www.opc.org/documents/WCF-
frames.html.
124. See Wilhelm, supra note 40, at 55, 62.
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agreement with the essentials of the Catholic doctrine of sub-
sidiarity. Implications on family law are numerous, but most rele-
vant to this discussion is that the Reformed tradition holds
families as the sacred conduit through which God works; this
institution was created by God and should be dissolved only
under the most extreme circumstances. This tradition would,
when the case is a close one, err on the side of the poverty-
stricken family facing termination of parental rights due to negli-
gent rather than abusive conduct.
VI. SOLUTIONS TO THE ASFA STRUCTURE
If the federal government is to fix the mess it has created, it
can begin by mandating greater state assistance toward case plans
before termination may be adjudged. Some services are still
badly lacking around the country. Indeed, for example, parents
with substance-abuse problems are not being treated by the states
with sufficient speed as they face termination of rights. One
scholar notes that in the wake of ASFA, "[d] espite the increasing
number of families needing support services, resources for treat-
ment have not increased.' 25 This was the chief concern that the
Illinois Supreme Court noted in In re H.G., holding the fifteen-
month provision invalid because it violated substantive due pro-
cess as applied to parents with problems such as substance
abuse. 1
26
Other approaches may entail turning to churches, extended
family, and other charitable organizations to meet the needs of
parents facing termination of their rights. President Bush's pro-
posed measures to aid faith-based charitable initiatives may aid
along this vein. 127 Admittedly, the statute does provide some
exceptions to the fifteen-month provision when a family member
is caring for the child in foster care, but in order to qualify under
an exception, the family member must be "approved" or certified
by the state as an acceptable care-giver.128 Repairs to the system
could come by the state giving extended relatives an automatic
grant of certification (or at least a rebuttable presumption of cer-
tification), pending a complaint to the contrary. Under the cur-
125. O'Flynn, supra note 20, at 246.
126. See generally 757 N.E.2d 864 (Il1. 2001).
127. See generally Carl H. Esbeck, Senior Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General,
Statement Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, House Comm. on the Judiciary, Con-
cerning Section 1994A (Charitable Choice) of H.A 7, The Community Solutions Act,
107th Cong. (June 7, 2001), reprinted in 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y (forthcoming 2002) (defending the constitutionality of charitable choice
and answering many of its critics).
128. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 675(1)(E) (West Supp. 1998).
2002]
646 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 16
rent system, it appears that a guilt by association complex is
operating within ASFA with regard to poor families (as well as
abusive parents).
Another solution would be to simply remove the fifteen-
month provision from the statute, but only with regard to parents
whose children were removed into foster care because of reasons
substantially related to poverty, usually classified under neglect.
This alteration would give states a better chance to provide the
services needed to bring parents back on their feet. It is true that
parents do not universally express a desire to be reunited with
their children. This will still affect state determinations of termi-
nation. But in all cases, the state should find ways to provide or
encourage families, churches, and other charitable organizations
to provide services needed to bring children back into an accept-
able environment.
In addition, the Act could be amended to tie federal funds
to states' use of "diligent efforts" rather than "reasonable efforts."
States could be encouraged to try harder with reunification in
neglect cases. While this extra effort is not justified in cases
where a parent has seriously abused the child or where reunifica-
tion would bring a continued threat of serious abuse, the extra
effort is certainly warranted in neglect cases where poverty is a
major factor in the parent's behavior.
In all of these matters, the expectations under ASFA should
be curtailed and the government should trust parents and
extended families more. Sound legal policy (noting the differ-
ence between abuse and neglect), as well as theological insight,
both point us to these types of solutions.
CONCLUSION
The ASFA has brought teeth into the system of federally
directed foster care, opening the door for children to be
adopted. But in doing so, it has not significantly reduced the
number of children in foster care. Many children are now legally
forever separated from biological parents but are still floating
around in the foster care system with no guarantee of adoption.
And in encouraging termination of the rights of parents, the fed-
eral policy engaged in assumptions that have taken the law too
far. Indeed, in light of M.L.B., Santosky, and Lassiter, some provi-
sions of ASFA may be unconstitutional as applied to poor parents
on procedural due process grounds. In light of In re H.G., the
fifteen-month provision and perhaps other provisions may be vul-
nerable to constitutional challenge in other states on substantive
due process grounds due to failing the narrow tailoring test.
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Abusive parents, especially those that commit or threaten
severe abuse, should be treated harshly and not given continual
chances. In those cases, the children suffer. But the cases of
extreme abuse are not the ones supplying the foster care popula-
tion-it is the cases of neglect, where often poverty is a major
factor, that supply the foster care system.
Under the current structure of ASFA, federal law creates a
presumption of mistrust of poor parents once the child has been
removed into foster care. The federal law encourages states to
treat abuse and neglect as the same offense, either one subject-'
ing parents to grave danger of permanently losing their children.
ASFA has placed many poor families on the defensive more than
ever before. The federal policy has encouraged states to reach
permanency goals that disproportionately break up the families
of poor, lower class Americans. This sanction affecting the poor
may call for a constitutional challenge in light of M.L.B. and In re
H.G., as discussed above.1 29 If, however, a constitutional chal-
lenge is ineffective, the ASFA should nevertheless be opposed as
a matter of social policy based on sound legal and theological
principles that respect the family and respect legal distinctions
between neglect largely due to poverty on the one hand and
abuse and violence on the other hand. Congress' social engi-
neering under the ASFA has, intentionally or not, left poor fami-
lies behind.
Proper federal solutions by way of amendment or repeal of
the ASFA include: (1) restoring the distinction between abuse
and neglect, (2) making petition for termination permissive
rather than mandatory after fifteen months in cases of neglect,
(3) changing "reasonable efforts" to "diligent efforts" in cases of
neglect, (4) removing the time limits on such "diligent efforts,"
and (5) working with state and community-based social initiatives
to ensure that poor parents are getting all services available
before they are subject to terminations based on neglect. With
these changes, the means employed to achieve the compelling
government interest of protecting children will be more narrowly
tailored. Under these proposed changes, society can continue to
protect children subjected to serious and violent abuse, and
move them toward adoption as quickly as possible, while ensur-
ing that poor families are not legally and permanently severed
unjustly.
129. M.L.B. may be the strongest support for a procedural due process
claim against the ASFA. The Illinois Supreme Court in In re H. G. invalidated a
portion of the ASFA under substantive due process.
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